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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Why a thesis on alienation - a concept so broad, so ubiquitous, 
so vaguely defined and so widely interpreted through such a variety of 
lenses as to be virtually unmanageable in any but an encyclopedic work? 
Further, why a thesis on alienation in the field of education rather 
than in one of its traditional domains - theology, philosophy, sociology, 
psychoanalysis, literary and art criticism, political science or economics? 
A study of critical pedagogy - of the work of those scholars (Kozol, 
Freire, Apple, Giroux, Mclaren, Habermas, Aronowitz, Bowles, Gintis, 
et aL ) who examine the complex relationship between schooling and 
culture, and the construction and maintenance of knowledge, ideology and 
hegemony - led to a desire to study the historical foundations of their 
thinking. Retracing the evolution of this body of thought did not 
uncover a linear progression or easily definable similarities, but did 
reveal one common thread in their discourse - an analysis and critique 
of modern (techno-industrial-bureaucratic) society, and by implication 
of a capitalist economy - a thread, which when followed led back to the 
development of critical theory within the Frankfurt School in Germany, 
and the re-evaluation and revitalization in the 20th century of Karl 
Marx's work. Further study, most notably of Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment suggested that the multivocal 
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critique of modern society had its foundation in a critique of Enlightenment 
thought itself, and was, at its best, an analysis, not only of capitalism, 
but of the implications of rationalism and empirical science, dominant 
modes of thinking that have constructed our present reality. 
At this point, the problem became one of narrowing my focus enough 
to study one aspect of this immense body of thought. I was intrigued 
with the concept of alienation, an interest that emerged from a study of 
new theories in "holistic", post-Liberal and "nee-Humanist'' educational 
philosophy. Recurring regularly in this body of thought was the notion 
that a "paradigm shift" was occurring, a notable change in our world-view 
in which the reccn::i.liation of certain polarities (subject/object division) · 
ard the transcen::Erce of an exclusive rationalism was taking place. These 
educational theories expressed a concern for an educational practice 
that would enable re-integration, dealienation - the reconnection of 
people with fragmented aspects of themselves, with each other, and 
importantly, with the natural world. 
This focus on re-establishing "unity" was an attractive idea - and 
many of the themes in this new thinking struck a responsive chord in 
me. After all, one does not have to look far to see the effects of 
''alienat~d thinking". Our lack of attunement with the natural world 
has led us to the brink of innumerable environmental disasters. Our 
failure to feel connected with other people is painfully visible in 
the many wars being fought and the incredible stockpile of nuclear 
weapons we have accumulated to "protect", ourselves from each other. 
The growing numbers of mental patients and the somewhat less visible 
multitudes who lead "lives of quiet desperation" attest to a high level 
of psychic fragmentation. Certainly, education must be considered a 
crucial factor in the resolution of these overwhelming problems. 
My main concern was that there was a noticable lack of a critical 
foundation in many of these theories, and the presence of more than a 
few tacit assumptions about the nature of reality. If we are indeed 
alienated, then we must be alienated "from" something. But from what -
an original, primal unity? A mystical oneness? A fixed ideal? or our 
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own unlimited potential? One has only to reflect on the basic curriculum 
question - what knowledge is most worthwhile? - and the relevance of 
such metaphysical and ontological questions becomes obvious. But where 
to begin? 
A survey of a wide variety of literature on alienation indicated 
that Karl Marx was a pivotal thinker in the study of the condition. 
His theories represent a major break with the assumptions of German 
Idealism espoused by such philosophers as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. 
I chose to examine Hegel's philosophical concept of alienation and 
explore in depth the transition between his thinking and that of Marx; 
a transition that uncovered another key figure, that of Ludwig Feuerbach. 
The division between Hegel and Marx is illustrative of a perennial 
philosophical dilemma - is the stuff of the universe a product of the 
workings of consciousness (transcendental monism)? Does matter give 
rise to mind (materialistic monism)? Is there a sort of "quasi-
dualism in which the stuff of the universe has both matter/energy 
aspects and mind/spirit aspects? (Griffin, 1988, p.126) 
I have tried to explore all three of these possibilities in this 
paper, in relation to the concept of alienation. The fundamental 
differences between Marx and Hegel have not yet been satisfactorily 
resolved, as is indicated in the post-modern debate on holism and 
totality. If anything, a century of scientific investigation has 
added numerous complexities to the debate. 
Finally, I chose to utilize the conceptual framework of the 
Perennial Philosophy in an attempt to contemporize the Hegelian/Marxist 
debate within a context that would be familiar to "holistic" thinkers, 
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and to create a background against which to compare, contrast, and perhaps 
find points of reconciliation in their thinking. By so doing, I hoped 
to come to a deeper understanding of the concept of alienation, and 
by extension, that of holism. 
CHAPTER II 
HEGELIAN IDEALISM 
Hegel's Meta-Physical Theory of Alienation 
All of which is only another way of saying that ... 
it is our affair to participate in this redemption 
by laying aside our immediate subjectivity (putting 
off the old Adam) and getting to know God as our 
true and essential self ... 
Hegel (in Tucker, 1961) 
Hegel's philosophical thought represented a radical departure 
from a medievalism that conceived of Heaven and Earth, the Divine 
and the human as irreconcilable spheres of existence. The Hebraic 
religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) in their exoteric forms 
all postulate the infinite transcendence, or otherness of God as 
eternally complete and perfect Being. By contrast, human nature 
is thought to be limited and imperfect. As Kirkegaard expressed it, 
"God and man are two qualities between which there is an infinite 
qualitative difference" (Tucker, 1961, p.32). The "original sin" 
in Christianity is mythically depicted as the ultimate transgression 
of human limitations - the seeking of knowledge that would make its 
possessor God-like. 
Hegel sought to bridge the chasm between the finite and the 
infinite by positing a surmountable degree of difference between them 
rather than an uncrossable, or at best, mediated abyss. To be sure, 
germinal ideas were present- in the works of some of his precursors -
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in Plato's view of the natural world as a realm of fleeting appearances 
in which the real world, the realm of ideals, unchanging and eternal, is 
imperfectly reflected; in Aristotle's identification of fully substantial 
being with spirit (Geist), and his firmly grasped conception of spirit 
as activity (Mure, 1940, p.53); in Rousseau's Emile, in which Hegel "had 
found a preliminary history of natural consciousness rising to liberty 
through particularly educative experiences which were specific to it" 
(Hyppolite, 1974, p.11); in Kant's conception of morality as a compulsion 
to achieve absolute moral self-perfection; and in literary expression, in 
the figure of Goethe's Faust, "absorbed in dreams of Godlike knowledge" 
(Tucker, 1961, p.31). 
This Faustian theme of finite man's infinite thirst for knowledge of 
the Absolute and desire for the transcendence of conflicts and contra-
dictions (Goethe, 1870) finds its way into Western philosophy with Hegel's 
committment to the concept of an Absolute Idea, or Mind, as a dynamic 
Self engaged in a circular process of alienation and dealienation. God 
(the Absolute Idea) becomes alienated from itself (externalized) in nature, 
then returns from its self-alienation in the Finite Mind (man - who is 
the Absolute in the process of dealienation). Self-alienation and 
dealienation are in this way the form of being of the Absolute. Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit is, in essence "the itinerary of the soul, which 
rises to spirit through the intermediary of consciousness" (Hyppolite, 
1974, p.11). 
This circular process is a history of consciousness engaged in 
experience, a negative dialectic similar to Plato's moment of skepticism 
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in which naive consciousness is purified. In order to understand the 
role of negation in this process (a determinate negation which engenders 
new content), one must assume that the whole is always immanent in the 
development of consciousness. The movement of consciousness is seen as 
a continual transcendence, a going-beyond itself, in which knowledge is 
disquieted, a disquiet that remains unassuaged as long as the end point 
of the process is not reached. This end point, or goal, is a point at 
which consciousness discovers itself, and beyond which knowledge need 
not go. The whole development is characterized by an immanent finality, 
glimpsed by the philosopher (Hyppolite, 1974, p.17). 
The Greek Roots of Hegel's Thought 
To do justice to the development of Hegel's thought one would have 
to delineate a history of Western philosophy, for like Aristotle and 
St. Thomas Aquinas before him, Hegel's scholarly efforts were devoted to 
the integration of all of the contributions of his major predecessors. 
As the history of Western philosophy is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it will at least be instructive to compare Hegel's thought with that 
of Aristotle, whom he held, with Plato, to be "the teacher(s) of the 
human race" (Mure, 1940, p.52), greater than any of their successors. 
Though Hegel's interpretation of the universe through the notion of 
self-consciousness was far more complex than that of Aristotle, his 
thought was very much a direct development of his Greek predecessor. 
Hegel's starting point was Aristotle's definition of spirit-
activity as the ''utter union of subject and object, the knowing which 
knows its knowing self" (Mure, 1940, p.53). He acknowledged sense-
perception as the intermediary in this union, an imperfect and intermediate 
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union, but prefiguring and approximating the Divine Self-knowledge. This 
differed somewhat from Plato's concept in which the Forms and the Knowing 
Soul were kindred, rather than identical. While Aristotle in some 
measure spoke in terms of the subject as an external spectator, Hegel 
reformulated his general principle to show a clear and necessary course 
of development from imperfect to perfect union of subject and object, an 
absorption of successive stages of development into the Absolutely real, 
a culmination which the Aristotelian system had led up to, but abandoned 
as intractable. The human Spirit, or Mind, is conceived by Hegel then, 
to be essentially a subject in relation to its object, the object as 
content, or proximate matter (in Aristotelian terms), and the subject as 
unifying form. "Hence the philosopher must not only treat subject and 
object together and in relation; he must treat the unifying subject as 
dominant in the concrete, and the object as that in which the dominant 
subject sustains and expresses its own nature" (Mure, 1940, p.62) 
The Hegelian Heresy 
In his Early Theological Writings, Hegel savagely assaulted 
historical Christianity as a corruption of the original teachings of 
Jesus. His interpretation of these teachings was one of the self-
actualization of man as a divinely perfect being, an actualization that 
he believed Jesus to embody. To him, Jesus did not represent God 
become man, but man become God. This became the key idea upon which 
the edifice of Hegelianism was constructed, that: 
There is no difference between the human nature and the 
divine. They are not two separate things with an 
impassable gulf between them. The absolute self in man, 
the homo noumenon, is not merely Godlike, as Kant would 
have it; it is God. Consequently, in so far as man strives 
to become 'like God', he is simply striving to be his own 
real self. And in deifying himself, he is simply recognizing 
his own true nature. Such recognition is preceded by 'faith', 
which is a middle state between non-recognition and 
recognition of the self as divine; it is a 'trust in one's 
own self'. Beyond it lies full scale recognition; when 
divinity has pervaded all the threads of one's consciousness, 
directed all one's relations with the world, and now breathes 
throughout one's being (Hegel, 1948, p.266). 
The Dialectic in Hegelian Thought 
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The methodology by which the self comes to know itself is a process 
of the successive transcending of limits through a dialectical process, 
a process intelligible when viewed within the larger context of Hegel's 
theory of history as the self-realization of God. The essential 
contradiction present in man, according to Hegel, is that of infinite 
spirit counterposed to the experiential state of finitude. The inner 
conflict generated by these oppositions constitutes the Hegelian 
dialectic. The way these contradictions are resolved is reflected in 
the insight that knowing an object must proceed beyond sense-perception 
to understanding via the restoration of the intuitive factor in 
knowledge. This non-rational process is an attempt to grasp the 
"inner essence" beyond external appearances, a concept which necessitates 
an acceptance of a supersensible world as a true world underlying the 
world of appearances; a dialectic of the essential and the inessential 
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(Gadamer, 1976, p.39-40). Because the self has become a "world-self", 
.the conflict becomes a "world-conflict", thus Hegel asserts that this 
basic contradiction is the very moving principle of the world. Though 
similar to both Kant and Fichte's concepts of endless progress toward 
higher degrees of perfection, it differs from their endless approximation 
ad infinitum by positing a consummation of the self-infinitizing process. 
Hegel perceives "culture" and "alienation" as kindred concepts. 
The first moment of development is one of immersion in nature, and is 
a moment which demands negation - "the self can gain its universality 
only through that opposition - the alienation which is culture" 
(Hyppolite, 1974, p.385). For Hegel, self can only be realized through 
the mediation of alienation, or estrangement, a process which is not 
an organic, harmonious growth, but one of rediscovery through self-
opposition and separation. Culture thus becomes the result of the 
alienation of natural man. Contrary to the pedagogy of the Enlightenment, 
which posited the development of reason as a continuous, linear path, 
Hegel presents us with an educational moment in which the self becomes 
unequal to, and thus negates itself, thus gaining universality (Hinchman, 
1984, p.250) - that educational moment is the moment of alienation, 
or estrangement. Robert Tucker neatly summarizes this process for us 
by the application of a ~ell known, if oversimplified triadic formula: 
... the given world-form or creative self-objectification of 
spirit is the 'thesis', the world apprehended by the knowing 
self as an alien and hostile object is the 'anti-thesis', 
and the world repossessed by the knowing self as a mental 
content is the 'synthesis'. (p.60) 
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Hegel's concept of alienation, as we have seen, was a meta-physical 
one, based in a critique of the dominant theology of the time, a theology 
which posited the earthly and the divine as separate and irreconcilable 
realms of existence. Hegel, in contrast, conceived of the reconciliation 
of the infinite spirit and the finite spirit, resulting in the spiritual 
subject, or absolute spirit, and was critical of the pervailing religious 
consciousness which projected this possibility of reconciliation into 
the far-off future (a reconciliation which did not imply a "becoming", 
but rather a "being with"). Hegel predicted that the separation of 
knowledge from truth could be overcome, not just in faith, but in true 
knowledge - "Divine universal man, the community, has not arrived at 
the knowledge of spirit as itself, and of itself as spirit. Its knowledge 
is not absolute knowledge " (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1974, p.580-581). 
Hegel claimed a philosophy free of suppositions. However, the 
concept of the Absolute Idea assumes the totality and connection that 
he wished to established, thus his system is representative of a 
speculative philosophy with a predetermined conclusion. To appreciate 
Hegel's philosophy, one must study him in the context of his time, a 
time in which people, under the influence of such thinkers as Descartes, 
had begun to experience themselves and their world in dualistic categories. 
If the notion of an absolute was to be retained, it would have to be 
shown that "this absolute required, for its very being and appearing, 
the sort of dualistic 'alienated' world whose typical expression was 
the Enlightenment. In this manner, philosophy could become a science 
describing the various guises in which the absolute appeared ... the whole 
would be an articulated series of definite forms, each vitally necessary 
to the self-defining of the absolute" (Hinchman, 1984, p. 41-42). In 
this way, Hegel attempted to gather together the diverse strands of 
Enlightenment thought into a coherent whole. 
It remained for his disciples to fully develop the cultural 
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and historical implications of Hegel's concept of alienation - to extend 
it beyond the theoretical, to enlarge it, critique it, and at last 
overthrow it, nonetheless retaining some of its essential characteristics. 
CHAPTER III 
FROM FEUERBACH TO MARX 
The Inversion of Hegelian Idealism 
Ludwig Feuerbach was associated with the group of disciples of 
Hegel known as the Young Hegelians, the most prominent of whom were 
Karl Marx, Freidrich Engels, Arnold Ruge, Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner. 
These young men engaged in a criticism of State and society during 
the reactionary period in Prussia following the July Revolution of 
1830 in France. Feuerbach contributed an incisive critique of religion 
in The Essence of Christianity and subsequent writings in which he 
posited the notion that religion represented an inverted picture of 
reality, and he called for a "religion of man in place of God" 
(Engels and Marx, 1939, p.x). This theme dominated Feuerbach's work 
from the initial critique of religion, through his attack on orthodox 
(Christian) philosophers, and finally in the inversion of Hegelian 
idealism, for which Marx attributed to him a genuine theoretical 
revolution (Tucker, 1961, p.95). Tucker (p.97) claims that Feuerbach 
was the "fulcrum of the movement of thought from Hegelianism to Marxism ... 
he freed Marx's mind from its bondage to (Hegel's system) ... by suggesting 
that it was an inverted representation of human reality, a reflection 
in the philosopher's mind of the existential condition of man in the 
natural war ld" (Tucker, 1961 , p. 97). Wartofsky considers Feuerbach 
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to be much more than a transitional figure between Hegel and Marx; 
rather, "an epochal figure in the history of philosophy, for the 
originality and fundamental character of his critique of philosophy 
itself" ( 1977, p.1). 
Hyppolite said that "Feuerbach preserves religion only to negate 
its essential elements" (1974, p.532). Indeed, he considered the 
critique of religion to be essential to human emancipation, for it 
was within religion that he believed he had found the paradigm for 
the process of alienation. Rather than accepting the notion of Hegel's 
Absolute Idea, which alienates itself as nature, then proceeds on a 
journey of self-discovery, transcending its alienation, Feuerbach 
posits an oppositional formula which takes real, earthly man, embedded 
in natural forces, as a primary reality - an earthly reality that 
Feuerbach argues is philosophical "in the sense that processes imputed 
by Hegel to spirit are actually operative in man" (Tucker, 1961, p.96). 
Religion is a primary source of alienation, according to Feuerbach, 
because "man (severs) from himself those powers and capacities which 
were at least potentially his; he had projected them into a God or 
fetish. He had thus made himself a slave to one of his own creations" 
(Kamenka, 1970, p.114). 
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Feuerbach considered alienation to be a form of intellectual error, 
which could be cured by an analysis of its content. In The Essence of 
Christianity, he details the valuable attributes of humanity that 
have been ascribed to a Being set over and above humanity: love, 
understanding, mercy, compassion, justice, will and.intelligence, to 
name but a few "species characteristics" that have been converted into 
this Divine 81eing. By projecting all of these positive qualities and 
potentials of the human species into the transcendent sphere and 
objectifying them as God, man, he argues, reduces himself to a pitiful, 
miserable, sinful creature. Feuerbach goes so far as to suggest that 
"all of the horrors of Christianity have flowed out of faith and out 
of the associated doctrine that only God has dignity and man is sinful" 
(Kamenka, 1970, p.52). Creation and miracles are portrayed by Feuerbach 
as acts of imaginative will, indifferent to causality, which provide 
a fantasy-gratification of man's desire to master nature and escape 
from causal necessity. 
Feuerbach is not opposed to what he perceives as the "essence" 
of religion - the longings and ethical valuations expressed in religion. 
He rather perceives that the element of alienation, of setting over 
and above himself what rightly belongs to man, increases as religion 
reflects upon itself, acquires a theoretical base - as it becomes 
theology. Theology, to Feuerbach, represents the final severing of 
God from man, thus consummating the alienation of humankind's highest 
qualities from itself and depressing even further the incomplete 
(thus sinful) man that is left over (Kamenka, 1970, p.54). 
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Feuerbach's critique of dogmatic belief was accompanied by an 
attack on orthodox (Christian) philosophers, whom he condemned as 
anthropomorphizing philosophers, bound to the finitude of sense-imagery, 
and unable to transcend the faculty of imagination to engage in reason. 
His first postdoctoral published work, Thoughts on Death and Immortality, 
was an open attack on theology in the service of a police state, and 
its revolutionary content put the seal on Feuerbach's hopes for either 
an academic or a literary career. He turned thereafter to philosophic 
work, most of it accomplished in rural isolation. His critique of 
religion served as a foundation for his critique of speculative 
philosophy, which he considered responsible for intensifying the 
alienation and abstraction begun by ordinary religion. 
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Though Feuerbach is often credited with the overthrow of Hegelianism, 
he continued to exhibit a certain ambivalence toward Hegelian thought 
even after his break with the major presuppositions of Idealism. After 
he had begun to question Hegel's premises, he spent a period of 
transitional advocacy from 1835-39, in which he defended Hegel against 
his orthodox critics, and even engaged in a critique of the limits of 
empiricism and materialism, as inadequate theories of explanation for 
rationality and scientific knowledge. He experienced a long, agonizing 
series of appraisals ranging from the defense of his master to a full 
attack on the foundation of his theory, and the end of this period was 
marked by his Critique of Hegelian Philosophy. In this, he stated 
that the Absolute was not absolute at all, but fantasy objectified, no 
more than an absolutization of the limited, historical person of the 
philosopher, and he attacked Hegelian Idealism as " 'nothing 
but' the most rigorous, most abstract, and most rational form of this 
very 'Christian' or 'theological' philosophy itself - its 'sober' 
rather than its 'inebriated form' but nevertheless 'theological' " 
(Wartofsky, 1977, p.169). He rejected speculative philosophy altogether 
as the embodiment of this deception and presented a demand, not for 
a more inclusive system, but for an end to system building itself. 
Feuerbach's break with Hegel comes earlier or later depending 
upon the interpretation of both Feuerbach and Hegel. There are elements 
of non-Hegelian thought in his early work and traces of Hegelian thooght 
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in his later work. In one sense, he remained Hegelian in that "the 
unifying theme of his work is the progress of human consciousness, the 
unfolding of self-awareness" (Wartofsky, 1977, p.141). He recognized 
that Hegel had established a valid form of development, albeit inverted -
the dialectic of consciousress with its other, and though Feuerbach 
makes no ontological claim of Absolute Idea, and in fact eschews the 
idea of speculative philosophy altogether, he utilizes this model of 
the process of consciousness coming to know itself as a model for the 
explanation of concept formation. In essence, he adopted what was 
revolutionary in Hegel in order to overthrow Hegel, separating himself 
from his own Hegelian standpoint and "turning the characteristic 
Hegelian critique of preceeding philosophies against Hegelianism itself" 
(Wartofsky, 1977, p.175). 
Some analysts consider Feuerbach a foundation stone of modern 
atheism. Indeed, the God of the theologians and the Being· or Substance 
of the metaphysicians are, to Feuerbach, nothing but human consciousness 
of its own nature, or human self-consciousness formulated in an 
alienated way. However, he does not reduce humans to a conglomerate 
of atoms, but rather raises them up from the status of a divine reflection 
to the status of conscious, sensate individuals who ·achieve universality 
by their activity. He understood religion to be a stage of growth in 
human self-consciousness, and in this sense was neither a positivist nor 
an atheist, "but an 'emergentist', for whom religion is a serious, 
(and dialectically necessary) expression of a certain stage of human 
self-understanding" (Wart of sky, p. 6) . This is. remarkably similar to 
Hegel's evaluation of religious consciousness. 
Feuerbach and Marx 
Karl Marx "saw in Feuerbach the anti-Hegel who had accomplished 
singlehandedly the revolutionary overthrow of 'the system' " (Tucker, 
1961, p.95). He considered Feuerbach to have led "the way out of the 
wilderness of German Idealism to real man in the material world" 
(Tucker, 1961, p.95). But Hegelianism retained a certain truth-value 
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for Marx as it did for Feuerbach - albeit an inverted one - and he 
perceived the world of Hegelian philosophical consciousness, in which 
spirit is alienated from itself and engaged in a process of transcendence 
of alienation as nothing but a mystical representation of the condition 
of man in the real world, the earthly reality being man's estrangement 
from himself. The main subject of Marx's early work thus became the 
self-alienation of man. One of the principle themes that began to 
emerge in his work was that "man's ultimate end is simply to become 
fully human, which he can not be so long as he remains alienated from 
himself in religious fantasies of self-realization" (Tucker, 1961, p.99). 
He develops the Feuerbachian thought that religion is but a consolation 
for man's failure to achieve full humanity, a theme which underlies 
the well known and much misunderstood statement that "Religion is the 
opiate of the people". 
However great Marx's debt to Feuerbach, he quickly began, true 
to the spirit of critical thought, to engage in criticism of his 
associate. In 1843, he joined with Bakunin and Ruge to plan the radical 
Deutsch-Franza Sische Jahrbucher of 1844,"in which he launched himself 
on the path from Feuerbach to Marxism" (Kamenka, 1970, p.117). His 
disagreements with Feuerbachian thought are explicated in his Theses 
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on Feuerbach, written in the Spring of 1845 as he and Engels began their 
collaboration on The German Ideology. One essential difference between 
he and Feuerbach was the importance Marx placed on "human sensuous 
activity, practice" (Engels and Marx, 1939, p.197), the revolutionary 
transformation of existing social conditions as opposed to Feuerbach's 
focus on the reorientation of thinking, a critical-cognitive transformation 
on the scale of all humanity. Feuerbach's emphasis was on "turning 
inward in search of a solution for self-alienation, whereas ... (Marx's 
focus was on) ... the need to turn outward against the world" (Tucker, 1961, 
p.101). Marx demanded the radical alteration of existing life situations 
in state and society in order for full human nature to be realized 
(Engels and Marx, 1939, p.198). 
Kamenka suggests that it is not fair to regard Feuerbach as a man 
unable to come to grips with political realities, but to understand 
that he and Marx had "fundamentally different conceptions of the 
process of political emancipation, of the nature and function of 
revolutions in social life" (Kamenka, 1970, 115). Feuerbach was 
essentially a democrat who believed that the source of man's bondage 
to reactionary governments lie in the illusions of the governed, of 
which religious illusions were the most significant. When religious 
illusions were unveiled and abolished, argued Feuerbach, a democratic 
frame of mind would emerge on the part of the governed, and political 
despots would lose their power over the lives of men. Marx considered 
this a relapse into abstract idealism, a failure to recognize the reality 
of existing social relations and present conditions of life 
(Engels and Marx, 1939, p. 37). 
In the seventh thesis (on Feuerbach), Marx accused Feuerbach of 
a failure to see that "religious temperament itself is a social 
product and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs to 
a particular form of society" (Engels and Marx, 1939, p.199). Within 
this thesis lies one of Marx's primary criticisms of Feuerbach's 
thinking - that as concrete and naturalized as Feuerbach's conception 
of man is, it lacks the historical, social and developmental categories 
that would concretize the notion of "species-being" (a concept that 
will be elaborated on in Chapter IV of this paper.) This criticism 
leads Marx to the position, enunciated in the eighth thesis, that 
"all social life is essentially practical. All the mysteries which 
urge theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human 
practice and in the comprehension of this practice" (Engels et al. , 
p.199). Marx believed that "there is no way of ending alienation short 
of revolutionizing the world in which man finds himself existing in an 
inhuman condition" (Tucker, 1961, p.102). As he states in his eleventh 
thesis, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, 
the point is, to dk3rY;e it" (Engels et al. , p. 199). Marx conceived of 
religion as the theoretical form of alienation, but recognized the 
many diverse practical forms of alienation present in every single 
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sphere of human activity - the state, the law, the family, morality, and 
not least of all, economic life. Thus he enlarged and extended the 
concept of man's alienation, providing a sociological frame of reference, 
and began a life-long critique of existing political, economic and social 
conditions. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARXIAN THEORIES OF ALIENATION 
Philosophical Foundation 
We have seen in the previous chapters of this thesis that the 
concept of alienation is deeply rooted in German Idealism. In Hegel's 
system of speculative philosophy it is descriptive of a universal process 
through which the Absolute Mind, or Spirit articulates itself in nature 
in order to come to know itself. Alienation in this sense is a logical 
necessity for the creative development of humanity. The very essence 
of Spirit is perceived to be activity realizing its potentiality, 
attaining ultimate fulfillment through the mediation of human consciousness. 
With the inversion of the Hegelian dialectic brought about by 
Feuerbach's humanist revision, man himself, not an abstract Absolute 
Spirit is determined to be the central subject of the historical process. 
With this inversion, the "abstract, universal subject is recognized as 
an alienation itself" (Somerville, 1974, p.293). This reform of the 
Hegelian dialectic and the reevaluation and discussion of the problems 
at the root of Hegel's philosophy informed the foundation of Marx's 
emerging economic /political theory as developed in the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (Marcuse, 1972, p.4). Contained 
within these manuscripts is both a critique which reveals the inadequacies 
and mistakes of the existing political economy and the basis and 
justification for the transformation of these conditions. In it, Marx 
develops the science of the necessary conditions for the communist 
revolution, a revolution that signified not just a realignment of 
economic factors, but the 
... positive abolition ..• of human self-alienation ..• the 
definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and 
nature, and between man and man •.. the true solution of the 
conflict between existence and essence, between objectification 
and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between· 
individual and species. (Marx, in Fromm, 1961, p.127) 
The potential reconciliation of contradictions implied in the 
above paragraph indicate that Marx was committed to the conception 
of a logically prior, universal alienation from which minor empirical 
alienations derive. It is around this broad generic sense of alienation 
as a logical concept that much of the confusion about Marx's thinking 
centers. Part of the problem stems from the residual Hegelianism 
contained in the manuscripts. According to Gregor, Marx here uses the 
concept of alienation to identify "the necessary process by which man 
objectifies himself as a species-being and thereby creates his world ... " 
(Somerville, 1974, p.295). The result of this human sensuous activity 
is spoken of as "private property" but in a broad, undifferentiated 
sense, not in the narrow sense of political economy. He can thus state 
that though private property appears to be the cause of alienated 
labor, it is really the consequence (when alienation is conceived in 
its ontological sense). At this point in his thinking, Marx conceived 
of human sensuous activity as having the same developmental and 
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dialectical character attributed to the Absolute Spirit by Hegel. 
To some critics the idea of self-alienation is untenable because 
it implies a fixed and unchangeable human essence or nature. But Marx 
conceived of alienation, not from an "ideal" but from historically 
created human possibilities and from man's own capacity for freedom 
and creativity (Bottomore, 1983). 
Marx's Concept of Human Nature 
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Before we discuss ~he concept of alienation within Marx's theoretical 
formulation, it will be useful to discuss his concept of human nature. 
When defining the characteristics that make man specifically human, Marx 
uses both a biological andan historical model. Within the biological 
model men are distinguished from the animals by their intellect, emotion 
and will, their ability to reflect upon themselves and their environment, 
and to consciously create and produce (Walliman, 1981, p.12). The key 
words that express this biological conception of man are "powers" 
and "needs". "Natural" powers and needs are those he shares with other 
living beings. "Species" powers and needs are those that man alone 
possesses, that set him apart as a "species-being" (a phrase coined 
from Feuerbach). Powers exist in man as faculties, abilities, functions, 
and capacities, and distinctive needs are created at different stages 
of history. As a "species-being", man has an awareness of his individuality, 
a self-consciousness (Ollman, 1971, p.74). In addition to this general 
theory of human nature based on the biological model, Marx introduced 
the notion of specific, historical criteria that determine not immutable, 
but changeable characteristics. Most misinterpretations of Marx's 
theory of human nature are probably due to a failure to distinguish 
between the two components of human nature, the biological and the 
historical (Wallimann, 1981, p.21). 
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Marx consciously avoids speculation as to initial causes, dismissing 
the question of creation as a pure product of abstract speculation. 
For him, nature and man exist on their own account, the result of 
spontaneous generation, and for Marx, all history begins "with the 
social activity of natural man; everything begins to exist for man at 
the moment when his natural being (i.e. powers) begin to work on and 
in nature in order to satisfy his natural human needs"(Axelos, 1976, p.21~. 
It is a characteristic of natural powers to seek fulfillment in objects 
external to man, hence the relations between needs and powers. Man 
feels "impulses" (needs), his abilities enable him to realize his powers, 
which satisfy needs, and his "tendencies" direct this realization 
toward certain goals. 
In his early writing, Marx reminds us that individuals stand in 
interaction with each other, but it is in The Grundrisse that he 
postulates that human interaction is qualitatively different from 
that of the animals. The proof of this difference, for him is that 
humans are capable of producing objects that can satisfy other's 
needs, thus reaching beyond their own individual needs. As further 
evidence of the social nature of man, he writes: 
If man is confronted by himself, he is confronted by the 
other man ... in fact, every relationship in which man (stands) 
to himself, is realized and expressed only in the relationship 
in which man stands to other men. (Marx, in Walliman, 1981, p.17) 
Walliman suggests that the biological model and the historical 
model, while mutually exclusive, are not irreconcilable but 
complementary. WHile the biological model determines those character-
istics that distinguish man from the animals, and thus define human 
nature, the historical model alone can explain differences in human 
behavior (nature) over time. 
Totality and the Philosophy of Internal Relations 
In Marx's "holistic" thinking, human nature contains all of nature 
as well as man, and the realization (objectification) of man's powers 
in nature is the transfer of elements within an organic whole; further, 
these powers are related to their own past and future forms as well as 
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to other entities in the present (Ollman, 1971, p.75). These assumptions 
hint at the importance and the controversy that the concept of totality 
has maintained throughout the development of both Marxist and non-
Marxist discourse. Roberto Unger writes, "There is no single tendency 
in the history of modern social thought more remarkable in its persistence 
or more far reaching in its influence than the struggle to formulate 
a plausible version of the idea of totality" (1975, p.125). The 
concept of totality is central to any discussion of alienation, as 
the concept of a unified, coherent, harmonious whole contrasts with, 
and thus defines such conditions as alienation, estrangement, frag-
mentation and contradiction. The enduring appeal of Marx's philosophy 
may indeed lie in a fundamental need for coherence and totality which 
characterizes human life and thought. 
The concept of totality is generally categorized as either 
a) normative, in which totality is equated with a desirable goal that 
is to be achieved, or b) non-normative, which stems from a methodological 
insistence that adequate understanding of complex phenomena can follow 
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only from an appreciation of their relational integrity (Jay, 1984, p.23-24). 
It is within this latter, non-normative framework that Marx's theory 
of internal relations finds expression, a theory which is useful in 
clarifying his concept of unity, both spatial and temporal, of man with 
all the rest of nature. Understanding this relational aspect of things 
to each other provides us with a conceptual framework for understanding 
Marx's view of both concepts and social components, as well as things, as 
relational. 
The philosophy of internal relations, though present in primitive 
conceptions of reality, first finds articulation in ancient Greek thought, 
which was concerned with the nature of the "halon". Greek thought 
''culminated in the elaborate neo-Platonic attempts to overcome the 
contingency of man's finite existence through recovering his lost unity 
with the universe" (Jay, 1984, p.25). The Greeks however, neglected to 
develop the concept of a linear, historical and cumulative totality, and 
generally favored a more cyclical interpretation of human experience. 
It was left to Jewish and Christian thinkers to develop what might be 
called a concept of longitudinal totality, or doctrines of historical 
fulfillment, which prefigured both in millenial prophecies of future 
Kingdoms of God on Earth, and some would argue, in Utopian visions such 
as Marx's communist fulfillment. Critics of such totalistic thinking 
assert that negative (non-existent) entities (classless societies, 
man without conflicts, realms of absolute harmony) can not be utilized 
to think about existing men or societies, that there is no normative 
totality which can be used as a critical vantage point. Merleau-Ponty 
goes so far as to say that the concept of a harmonious end of history 
was "an idealization of death" rather than a realization of life (1973,p.206). 
There is validity to the notion that Marx shared an essentially 
organic vision of the social whole with some of his philosophical 
predecessors, but there were important distinctions. While Aristotle's 
organic holism was generally used to legitimate social differentiation 
and heirarchy, Marx's was clearly more critical in intent. As we have 
seen, Marx is certainly indebted to Hegel for his appreciation of the 
dialectical role of contradiction in the development of consciousness, 
though he rejected Hegel's concept of a pre-existent Absolute Idea, or 
unity. And though Marx shared with Spinoza a rejection of the dualism 
of mind and external reality, his insistence on the role of creative 
human activity as central to the process of becoming contrasted with 
Spinoza's eternal, existing, unchanging totality, a totality which 
lacked an historical, developmental dimension. 
Although Marx's philosophical rebellion began with his refusal 
tci accept Hegel's notion that ideas existed independently from matter 
(a rebellion which was to come to fruition decades later in the 
concept of dialectical materialism,a phrase never used by Marx or 
Engels), the relational concept was a clear outcome of his Hegelian 
roots. The relational view was elaborated and complemented by the 
work of Joseph Dietzgen, the little-known philosopher and German tanner. 
He declared that the ''whole truth about any one thing includes (because 
of its internal relations) the truth about everything" (Ollman, 1971, 
p.37). He recognized the reality of the external world to be a vast 
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array of sense perceptions whose interdependence makes them a single 
whole, and understood the possibilities of categorization to be infinite. 
Crucial to his thinking was the notion that human conceptual activity 
is responsible for the precise forms in which we grasp the world. 
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Marx, while in agreement with Dietzgen about the primacy of individuation, 
or human conceptualization in determining perception, stressed the 
priority of social fa:::tors as determinants in the formation of concepts. But 
"in stressing social factors, Marx does not dispense with the broad 
philosophy of internal relations in which he was initially introduced 
to them" (Ollman, 1971, p.33). 
Ollman presents four evidences to defend the centrality of relational 
theory in Marx's thinking. First, is the tendency of Marx to attribute 
both the quality of isolate- existence (thing-ness) and the quality of 
relationship to all entities (human and otherwise). Thus he can call 
man both a living, conscious thing, and an aggregate of social relations. 
Secondly, he treats man and nature as inextricably linked, not only in 
a metaphoric or poetic way, but as processes whose evolutions are 
dynamically connected. Third, is his apparent rejection of simple 
causal explanations derived from commonsense views of nature (the sun 
causes the plant to grow) in favor of a view that posits physical objects 
(sun and plant) as having their natures "outside themselves, such that 
the relations between them is conceived as appertaining to each, and 
is part of the full meaning conveyed by their respective concepts" 
(1971, p.28). Fourth, the ideas contained in relational thinking are 
consistent with the philosophical tradition in which he was nurtured, 
that of Spinoza, Leibniz and Hegel, a mode ~f inquiry that sought for 
both the meanings of things, and for the terms characteristic of their 
relations within the whole. 
Ollman concedes that the philosophy of internal relations is in 
some disrepute, but insists that the burden of proof rests with those 
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who believe Marx discarded it, in which case he demands to know the 
conception of things and social factors with which he replaced it. It is 
for its usefulness as an analytical tool with which to explore the 
elements of Marx's political economy that pertain to man's alienation 
under capitalism, that I will assume, as does Ollman, that the philosophy 
of internal relations is foundational to the development of Marx's 
thinking. 
Alienated Labor 
Though some Marxist analysts maintain that the concepts of alienation 
and estrangement disappeared in Marx's later work, to be replaced by 
such concepts as reification (Israel, 1976), or by scientific terms 
such as private property, class domination, exploitation and division 
of labor (Bottomore, 1983), others, such as Erich Fromm contend that 
the.concept remained the focal point in the thinking of both the "young" 
Marx who wrote the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and the "old" 
Marx who wrote Capital (1961, p.51). Becker (1967, p.98) believes that 
while not abandoning the concept, Marx shifted ground from the ideal 
to the possible. The assertion that Marx abandoned the concepts in 
his later work is weak on at least two counts, according to Walliman 
(1981, p.147). First, although a certain vocabulary distinguished 
these ideas in his early work, Marx's theory of estrangement is derived 
from his definition of human nature, a definition which remains con-
sistent in both his early and his later work. Secondly, in response to 
those who maintain that Marx abandoned the terms "alienation" and 
"estrangement", Mezaros (1972) shows that he actually continued to make 
use of the terms in his later writings, though not as frequently as 
in the Manuscripts. 
Before we discuss the relationship between alienation and man's 
productive activity, it will be useful to clarify the terms "alienation" 
and "estrangement". There is considerable discrepancy in the use of the 
terms by both Marx and his many translators. Walliman presents evidence 
based on careful linguistic analysis to show that while the word 
"entausserung" is used predominantly to describe any "situation in 
which somebody divests ... himself of something, be it property in the 
form of a thing, land, or one's labor power", and is predominantly 
translated as "alienation", the word "entfremdung" (estrangement) 
appears to designate a particular, stronger form of alienation, in 
which the previous owner of a thing is affected in a way which is 
beyond his control (Walliman, 1981, p.42). 
Work, in Marx's view is the essence of human life, the process by 
which man creates the world and thus creates himself (work,of course 
being inclusive of intellectual and artistic as well as manual labor). 
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Any productive activity thus constitutes a generalized type of alienation, 
or externalization. With the involuntary division of labor and the 
advent of private property (referring now to the private ownership 
and control of the productive forces rather than the generalized objects 
of man's activity), labor loses the characteristic of being expressive 
of man's unique powers and assumes "an existence separate from man, his 
will and his planning" (Fromm, 1961, p.47). Alienation thus becomes 
estrangement when man ceases to exercise direction over his productive 
activity. 
The object produced under coercion (for under the system of 
capitalist economics, most people have no choice but to "work for a living") 
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becomes "an alien being, a power independent of the producer" (Marx, 1961, 
p.95). Labor becomes embodied in an object, a physical thing, and this 
product thus becomes an "objectification" of labor. Just as in 
Feuerbach's thought, man diminishes in relation to what he attributes to 
God, Marx contends that man diminishes in relation to the life he pours 
into the creation of such objects: 
The alienation of the worker in his object is expressed 
as follows in the laws of political economy; the more the 
worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more 
value he creates the more worthless he becomes; the 
more refined his product the more crude and misshapen 
the worker; the more civilized the product the more 
barbarous the worker; the more powerful the work the 
more feeble the worker; the more the work manifests 
intelligence the more the worker declines in intelli-
gence and becomes a slave of nature. (Marx, 1961, p.97) 
Thus work becomes extraneous to the worker's true desires and does 
not fulfill, but denies his innermost needs. In this way, man is 
prevented from fully developing his mental and physical powers, and 
the relations between his activity and his powers remain at a low 
level of achievement. When man creates objects under conditions of 
estranged labor, these objects take on a certain power by distorting 
the normal relations between man and his objects: the worker must 
adjust to the demands of the product and the mode of production (as in 
the necessity to match the worker's rhythm to that of the machine in 
factory work); the worker no longer employs the means of production, 
but vice versa; products can preceed and create need (stereo sets 
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create needs for records); and products can create a way of life (witness 
the modern slavery to the automobile or the role of TV in diminishing 
the development of folk culture) (Ollman, 1971, p.141-146). 
We have seen from Marx's description of alienated labor that there 
are two general categories of relations included in the topic - the relation 
of the worker to the activity itself, and the relation to the object 
created, or the product. Alienation to the activity occurs because of 
the contradiction between man's free, reflective, autonomous nature 
and the exploitation of his labor and powers by an alien force outside 
of himself: 
Alienation is apparent not only in the fact that my means 
of life belong to someone else, that my desires are the 
unattainable possession of someone else, but that everything 
is something different from itself, that my activity is 
something else, and finally (and this is also the case for 
the capitalist) that an inhuman power rules over everything. 
(Marx, 1961, p.151) 
Labor - life activity - now becomes to man only a means for the 
satisfaction of a need, the need to maintain his physical existence, 
not the central meaning-making activity of life. We have seen that 
Marx considers it an essential aspect of human nature to reproduce 
itself by appropriating external nature and expressing itself in the 
creation of real, sensuous objects. This "objectification" is a pre-
condition for the self-conscious development of man. The conflict 
occurs when man relinquishes the object as part of his essence , allows 
it to become independent and overpowering, a possibility which becomes 
a reality under conditions of estranged labor and private property (Marcuse, 
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1972, p.18). 
The Communist Revolution 
Communism for Marx, is above all a society devoid of estrangement. 
In the preceeding sections we have discussed some of the conditions that 
lead to estrangement, which in a very broad sense can be reduced to the 
involuntary division of labor. For Marx, the preconditions under which 
humans might begin to develop their full potential are the voluntary 
division of labor, the abolition of private property (meaning the forces 
of production), and the appropriation of the productive forces developed 
under capitalism. For Marx, the involuntary division of labor and 
private property are identical terms (I would add, in a Relational sense), 
in that they both affirm alienation, and are both the cause and result of 
each other (Walliman, 1981, p.89). 
Marx's vision of socialism has been much misunderstood. It is not, 
as is sometimes thought, a society of regimented, automatized individuals -
well fed , with equalized incomes - functioning within constricted mental 
and psychic boundaries. It is not "a society in which the individual 
is subordinated to the state, to the machine, to the bureaucracy" (Fromm, 
1961, p.58). According to Fromm, "the aim of socialism is man. It is to 
create a form of production and an organization of society in which man 
can overcome alienation from his product, from his work, from his fellow 
man, from himself and from nature; in which he can return to himself 
and grasp the world with his own powers, thus becoming one with the 
world" (Fromm, p. 58-59). 
Marx conceived of a realm of freedom in which man could develop all 
of his powers, but he perceived that the productive forces must reach 
a level of sophistication in which ·labor under the compulsion of 
necessity and of external utility would no !anger be required. 
Some of the essential elements of socialism as outlined by Marx include 
1) political and industrial democracy, in which the forces of production 
are under man's control instead of ruling him like a blind power (from 
this we might infer that industry would be arranged on a human scale), 
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2) that man would become independent and not be crippled by an alienated 
form of production and consumption, and 3) that living itself would 
supercede producing the means for living. Marx never conceived of 
socialism as the fulfillment of life, but as the conditions for fulfillment. 
He foresaw a culture in which man would be freed from the chains "not 
only of economic poverty, but of the spiritual poverty created by 
alienation" (Fromm, 1961, p.61). A culture such as this would be 
predicated on a system of production based on cooperation and consensus. 
Marx's theory of the communist revolution has something of the 
snake chasing its tail in it. True to the Hegelian scheme of things, 
the destructive process (alienated labor under capitalism) is the 
decisive cause of a constructive outcome (appropriation of the "fully 
developed'' productive forces). In Capital, Marx holds that "the 
acquisitive fanaticism is itself responsible for creating those new 
conditions of social wealth in which this fanaticism will no longer 
exist'' (Tucker, 1961, p.223). The suffering of the workers under 
capitalism becomes the transformative factor, the motive force for the 
overthrow of the system, and Capital becomes the agent of its own 
destruction. 
Though many discrepancies have become apparent in Marx's economic 
theories, Marxism remains a potent political ideology in many Parts of 
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the world, attributable perhaps, more to the imperatives of political 
power than to the intellectual persuasiveness of his doctrine. Marx, 
quite understandably, failed to foresee the capacity of capitalism to 
contain its contradictions - to coopt its minor rebellions - and he 
certainly could not have predicted some of the political travesties that 
have occured in his name. Critics that accuse him of economic determinism 
make the mistake of equating the precondition of a solution with the 
solution itself. The overcoming of human self-alienation remained the 
supreme concern of Marx and the central theme of his thought. 
To disregard the question of the relative decline and continuity 
of Marx's thought, we must keep in mind that "From the start communism 
had meant to him essentially the restoration of community in the self-
relation, and communist 'society' had been defined as the 'complete 
essential unity' of man with himself. It meant the society of man with 
the inner self and with the anthropological nature outside him" (Tucker, 
1961 , p. 235) . It was, am continues to be, a Utopian vis ion of a future 
world, a "higher type of society" which would have as its guiding 
principle the "full and free development of every individual" (Ibid, p.235). 
In the next chapter, I will raise some of the questions, problems and 
contradictions inherent in Marx's theory of the development of 
consciousness, when compared to some of the elements of the "perennial 
philosophy". 
CHAPTER V 
ALIENATION AND THE PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY 
Tenets of the Perennial Philosophy 
He whose vision cannot cover 
History's three thousand years 
Must in outer darkness hover 
Live within the day's frontiers. 
Goethe 
Central to the philosophical activities of Hegel, Feuerbach and 
Marx was a struggle to understand the essence of human existence, and 
the relationship of the individual to a greater whole. Hegel con-
ceived of alienation as a psychological condition brought about 
through the projection of the Absolute (the Whole) into externalized 
(partial) reality, while Marx conceived of it more as a psycho-social 
reality generated under conditions of alienated labor, with Feuerbach 
falling somewhere in between. They all perceived the resolution of 
alienation to be a developmental process which included a dialectic 
between the self and an other, a process which was thought to result 
in ever greater syntheses. While Hegel posited an ultimate synthesis, 
the final merger of the individual part with the Absolute Whole, Marx 
steered clear of such assumptions, positing instead a Utopian mater-
ial reality in which innate human power and potential could be fully 
manifested. 
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The perennial question of human relationship to the greater whole 
has been explored in depth throughout the philosophic and religious 
traditions of recorded history. Though "the Perennial Philosophy is 
primarily concerned with the one, divine Reality substantial to the 
manifold world of things and lives and minds" (1944, p. viii), Aldous 
Huxley, in his book The Perennial Philosophy, distinguishes two dis-
tinct forms of inquiry into and expression of, perennial ideas; 
a) first-hand, wherein people have the immediate, direct personal ex-
perience of sublime knowledge, and b) second-hand, which is the study 
and expression of the first-hand experiences of others. Though many 
Western philosophers have achieved renown for their brilliant inter-
pretations of perennial ideas, most have relied on such second-hand 
analysis. In developing a context in which to compare and contrast 
the ideas of Hegel and Marx, the focus in this chapter will be on 
those first-hand exponents of the perennial philosophy whom Huxley 
terms "sages" or "enlightened ones" (1944, p.ix). Such a focus is 
consistent with the developmental emphasis of both Hegel and Marx, 
who stressed, albeit somewhat differently, the importance of direct 
experience to the expansion of consciousness. 
Philosophia Perennis, a phrase coined by the German philosopher 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, signifies a group of ideas which represent 
the core of a number of diverse mystical traditions. It is a meta-
physic which recognizes a divine Reality or essence inherent in the 
substantive world of objects, people and minds; a psychology that 
notes a correspondence between an essential human soul-quality and 
this divine Reality; an ethic that posits man's ultimate destination 
as the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent Ground of all Being -
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a thing immemorial and universal. The infinite, Absolute Godhead is 
metaphorically conceived as this Ground, or nature of all that is, 
rather than as an entity set apart from its creations. The Absolute 
is not perceived as Other, but rather as sewn through the fabric of 
all creation. All things are perceived to exist in balanced wholeness, 
and history is thought to be the story of the unfolding relationship 
between man and the ultimate Whole, a relationship that pa,rallels 
the unfolding of human consciousness 
The fundamental ideas.of the Perennial Philosophy are present in 
the traditions of Taoism, Hinduism, Sufism, Mahayana Buddhism, Tantra, 
and esoteric Christianity, as well as in rudimentary form in the trad-
itional lore of primitive societies. Additionally, it has been embraced 
in whole or in part by such gifted intellectuals as Einstein, William 
James, Jung, Schopenhauer, Schrodinger and Bohm. Though many of the 
traditions possess extensive written texts, the key to understanding 
the principles of the Perennial Philosophy is said to lie in the dir-
ect apprehension and experience, rather than a discursive analysis of 
the phenomenon. Though language is commonly used to describe the var-
ious states of consciousness that inher in the common experiences of 
this reality, the fundamental principles can, according to its adher-
ents, be perceived apart from any particular vocabulary. Indeed, one 
of the difficulties of communicating these experiences has been the 
problem of trying to use symbol systems that are relevant to the facts 
of an altogether different order of things in the descriptive process. 
Mystery and misunderstanding enshroud these mystical traditions. 
At first acquaintance, one is tempted to relegate them to the dustbin 
of European Idealism and speculative philosophy, were it not for the 
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fact that the commonalities of these mostly isolated traditions reveal 
an empirical approach to the problem of consciousness; an approach in 
many cases, such as that of the advanced Yogis, or Tantrics, based on an 
experiential, experimental intuitional science. In fact, "in its purest 
form it is not at all anti-science but, in a special sense, trans-science 
or even ante-science, so that it can happily coexist with, and certainly 
complement, the hard data of the pure sciences" (Wilber, p.4). 
Central to many of the traditions encompassed by the Perennial 
Philosophy is the concept of the Atman, which is said to be part of the 
eternal, undifferentiated Self which resides in the depth of all 
particularized, individual selves, and is identical to the divine Ground. 
The teaching is succinctly expressed in the Sanskrit phrase TAT TVAM ASI 
(that art thou), meaning that the Atman, or immanent eternal self, is 
one with Brahman, the Absolute Principle of all existence. As stated 
by Shankara, who systematized the teachings of the Upanishads and the 
Bhagavad-Gita in the 9th century AD: 
The Atman is that by which the universe is pervaded, but 
which nothing pervades, which causes all things to shine, 
but which all things cannot make to shine. 
The Atman is one, absolute, indivisible. It is pure 
consciousness. To imagine many forms within it is like 
imagining palaces in the air.. Therefore, know that you 
are the Atman, ever-blissful, one without a second, and 
find the ultimate peace. Remain in the joy which is 
silence. 
To the man who has realized the Atman as his true being 
and who has tasted the innermost bliss of the Atman, there 
is no more excellent joy than this state of silence, in 
which all cravings are dumb. 
The Atman is the witness of the individual mind and its 
operations. It is absolute knowledge. 
Shankara 
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In the Taoist tradition, the universal immanence of the Ground of 
existence is expressed in the book of Chuang-Tzu, most of which was 
probably written around the turn of the 3rd and 4th century BC: 
Do not ask whether the principle is in this or in that; 
it is in all beings. It is on this account that we apply 
to it the epithets of supreme, universal total ... It has 
ordained that all things should be limited, but it is Itself 
unlimited, infinite. As to what pertains to manifestation, 
the principle causes the succession of its phases, but is 
not this succession. It is the author of causes and effects, 
but is not the causes and effects. It is the author of 
condensations and dissipations (birth and death, changes 
of state), but is not itself condensations and dissipations. 
All proceeds from It and is under its influence. It is in 
all things, but is not identical with beings, for it is neither 
differentiated nor limited. 
Chuang-Tzu 
Or as expressed in the Tantric sutras of Anandamurti: 
VIS'AYE PURUS'A'VA BHA'SHAH JIIVA'TMA (Unit consciousness, or 
soul, JIIVA'TMA, is the reflection of Purus'a [consciousness], 
and is the witnessing entity). 
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According to these sutras, "there is actually only one Atman - as 
several pools of water will give several reflections of the moon above -
still there is only one moon. When there is no more Jiiva (unit soul, 
unit consciousness), Jiiva'tman (individual mind) merges in Parama'tman 
(Supreme Mind)" (Anandamurti). 
One of the easiest ways to understand the concept of the Atman is 
with the phrase "witnessing entity". The notion of the witnessing entity 
can be arrived at through a process of negation in which one first 
becomes aware that "I" am not my body, by separating the "I" feeling 
(the subject) from the physical layer of the self (the object); nor am 
"I" the sense organs, etc. One moves through progressively more subtle 
layers of experience - "I'' can experience emotions, but these emotions 
are not "I". Finally, the only thing left is one's thought processes, 
and thus the final step becomes the negation of thought itself as "I". 
"Now the exquisite difficulty at this point is that the thought of 1 I 1 
which you originally placed in the middle of your head .•. is also (and 
specifically)~ thought which ir• is not. So e~en the thought of 'I' 
must go .•. It's a little like climbing out on the farthest branch of a 
tree and then cutting off the branch" (Ram Dass, 1971, p.87). If one 
has sufficient mental discipline to carry this process of negation through 
to completion, one enters into the realm of SAT CHIT ANANDA, as the 
Yogis call it (Reality Consciousness) - the true Self - where there is 
only ONE. This final merger of the witnessing entity of the unit 
consciousness, and the Supreme Witnessing Entity is the ultimate 
dissolution of subject and object, and reflects the recognition by 
adherents of the Perennial Philosophy of the necessity of transcending 
the limitations of the rational mind. As in Hegel's dialectic, the 
rational process is used as a powerful tool to get beyond itself. 
Mystics have long understood the precise limitations of the 
rational mind, which functions by separating subject from object, 
knower from known. "It works with data derived from the senses and 
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the associative process of the intellect (the memory). It works by 
analysis, a systematic processing technique that is based on the laws 
of logic" (Ram Dass, 1971, p.85). The limitations of the rational mind 
include its inability to handle paradoxical or illogical information, 
and to know that which can only be experienced subjectively. It is 
quite well recognized through autobiographical accounts of great 
breakthroughs in our understanding of the universe, that intuition, or 
direct apprehension, rather than systematic analysis often led to the 
breakthrough. "I didn't arrive at my understanding of the fundamental 
laws of the universe through my rational mind" - A. Einstein. (Ram 
Dass, p.86). 
Zen masters have developed the technique of the "koan" to push 
the rational mind beyond its limits to the level of paradox and ambi-
quity, in order to synthesize (or transcend) the dualism of the senses. 
(Suzuki, 1964, .p.106). 
The koan is neither a riddle or a witty remark. It has a most 
definite objective, the arousing of doubt and pushing it to its 
fartrest limits ... to speak conventionally, there are unknown 
recesses in our mirds vJ1i.ch lie beyond tre thres!Told of our relatively 
constructed consciousness ... (the) throwing of your entire being 
against the koan unexpectedly opens up a hitherto unknown region 
of the mind. Intellectually, this is the transcending of the 
limits of logical dualism, but at the same time it is a regen-
eration, the awakening of an inner sense which enables one to 
look into the actual workings of things ... the koan breaks down 
all the hindrances to the ultimate truth. 
(Suzuki, 1964, p.108-109) 
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Although it may seem from the above examples that the Perennial 
Philosophy is peculiar to the Oriental mind, a clear thread of conscious-
ness of "the God within" runs through a minor Western tradition which 
includes some early Greek thinkers, Catholic mystics of the 14th and 
15th centuries and the contemplative tradition of the Quakers, to 
mention just a few examples. Generally, however, the orthodox Western 
conception of God is that of "an ontological Other, separated from us 
by nature, forever ... there is not just a temporary line between man 
and God, but an unmoveable boundary and barrier ... God and man are 
forever divorced - they are not, as in Hinduism and Buddhism, ultimately 
one and identical" (Wilber, 1981, p.3). The Perennial Philosophy 
regards God, not as a colossal Being, Big Daddy, or a Creator set 
apart from his creations but as the very "Ground" or "suchness" or 
condition of all things and events. The apprehension of the basic 
unity of all phenomena is at the heart of the mystical experience. 
From the foregoing description of the Perennial Philosophy, one 
can discern a great similarity to Hegelian thought. Essential aspects 
of it also correspond to Marxist thought, though Marx's theories are 
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thought to be limited to a certain phase of human development). And 
unlike orthodox religions, the Perennial Philosophy reinforces, rather 
than negates Feuerbach's idea that Being and Substance are nothing but 
human consciousness of its own nature. As Ken Wilber, who has compiled 
a vast amount of mythological, anthropological, historical, archaeological, 
cultural and psychological evidence to support his perennial theory 
of human development says, "History is the narrative of man's relationship 
to his own deepest Nature, played out in time, but grounded in eternity" 
(Wilber, 1981, p.11). Wilber's theory of human development, a theory 
which places the tenets of the Perennial Philosophy in an historical 
context, provides us with an interesting conceptual framework in which 
to view the theories of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. 
The Development of Consciousness 
Any historical study that deals in "eras" or "epochs", especially 
of human consciousness, runs the risk of dealing in abstractions at the 
expense of specificities. This in fact, is the primary critique leveled 
by Marxist historians and Marx himself at general historians - that they 
have sacrificed the particular in favor of the abstract. Yet both 
Hegel and Marx espoused a "structural-developmental" view of individual 
consciousness, a view which is both paralleled in many w~ys and enlarged 
by Wilber's study. All seem to agree that though the details of 
individual development differ, there exists a "universal sequence of 
heirarchic levels of increasing consciousness'' (Wilber, 1981, p.7). 
Marx, of course, concentrated mainly on the problem of bringing about 
conditions conducive to the development of "full human potential'', 
refraining from speculation about what such potential might signify. 
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Hegel posited a merger of the individual with the Absolute as the 
ultimate human condition. Within the context of the Perennial Philosophy, 
Hegel's theories are seen to be more developed and inclusive, and the 
concept of the Atman, which is central to mystical traditions, helps 
to clarify what Hegel may have meant by the "ultimate merger of subject 
and object". 
Central to an understanding of the process that Hegel perceives as 
the primary "alienation" is Wilber's dual concept of involution/evolution, 
a concept which is shared by many of the mystical traditions (in Tantric 
philosophy it is called Saincaradhara/Prati Saincaradhara). In this 
process, Spirit manifests itself downward as potentiality, descending 
the "Great Chain of Being" from complex, higher structures into lower, 
simpler ones. According to Wilber, "at the end of involution, all the 
higher structures exist, as enfolded potential, in the ground unconscious ... 
and are now ready to unfold in evolution'' (1981, p.302). Wilber bases 
this idea on the observation that the opposite process, that of evolution, 
has consistently produced higher order wholes, a result which "natural 
selection" fails to account for (1981, p.304). This perennial view of 
evolution posits the magnetic attraction of the "Jiiva'tman" (unit 
consciousness) for the "Parama'tman" (Supreme consciousness), and claims 
to explain why evolution is a progressive advancement that "proceeds 
in leaps and bounds that far outdistance statistical probabilities ... 
a view that does that which Darwinism cannot: account not only for the 
what of evolution but the why" (1981, p.305). "Evolution is but a 
process of metamorphosis of consciousness, and the physical body merely 
adapts itself to the metamorphosis of mind and consciousness" 
(Krtashivananda, 1988, p.21). 
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The materialist historian is certain to be knashing their teeth at 
this point, and it is well beyond the scope of this paper to develop a 
scientific basis of support for the theory of involution, rather I will 
assume it as one possible explanation for the holistic tendency of 
evolution. It is important to keep in mind that this totalistic view 
of evolution is not a telos that aim~ at the reconciliation of the 
individual with a determined ideal. The ground unconscious does contain 
an invariant "deep structural" logic, but a surface structure molded by 
social, cultural and historical contingencies. This differentiation 
between deep and surface structures appears to permit at least a partial 
reconciliation between Hegelian and Marxist logic, between the perennial 
and the materialist version of history. The only evolutionary outcome 
posited in the Perennial Philosophy is an "awareness of the unity and 
mutual interrelation of all things and events, the experience of all 
phenomena in the world as manifestations of a basic oneness" (Capra, 
1975, p.117). The foregoing quote issues from a 20th century physicist, 
a high priest of the branch of study most concerned with the study of 
material phenomena, who also goes on to say that "the basic oneness of 
the universe is not only the central characteristic of the mystical 
experience, but is also one of the most important revelations of modern 
physics" (p.117). Is this notion of the relatedness of all phenomena 
significantly different from Marx's theory of internal relations? In 
fact, might Marx not have been well ahead of his time with a type of 
holographic thinking in which all of the isolated parts contain the 
information of the whole? 
If the theories of Hegel, Marx, Feuerbach and Wilber differ on the 
Omega of evolution, and by implication on the Alpha of involution, they 
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seem to be in basic agreement about the Alpha of evolution, or the 
primary condition of man. Marx and Hegel both speak of man's original 
embeddedness in nature, a stage which Hegel calls "bewusstsein'' - bodily 
awareness, or the sensory perception of an external world without any 
mental reflection or self-consciousness. Wilber too, speaks of a period 
which he calls the ''uroboric", in which the self and the natural envir-
onment were not clearly and sharply differentiated - a primal ''Eden" of 
instinctual harmony with physical and biological nature. Evolution, at 
this time, had already succeeded in proceeding in heirarchic order, 
from lifeless atoms, through vegetal structures, through the simple 
animal forms (protozoan, amphibian, reptilian) and on to higher mammalian 
forms - forming the substructure upon which, and beyond which human 
consciousness would be built (Wilber, 1981, p.21). As Carl Sagan points 
out in Dragons of Eden, humans include and transcend all prior evolutionary 
stages (1977). This tallies closely with Hegel's observation that "to 
supercede is at once to negate and to preserve" (Wilber, p.21), and 
reinforces the perennial concept that each higher level of development 
must transcend, yet include each lower level in its higher order synthesis 
and unity. Failure to do so, according to Wilber, is not transcendence, 
but repression, and leads to dissociation, fragmentation, and I might 
add, alienation. The primordial human condition is sometimes likened 
to the infant's state of non-differentiation, not that ontogeny 
literally recapitulates phylogeny, but that there are certain similarities 
in the two fields of development - they are both prior to the emergence 
of reason, logic, personality and subject/object division. 
The second broad mode of consciousness that Wilber describes is a 
stage he calls the ''tymphonic", which is distinguished by a preliminary 
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sense of separation, an emergence from the subconscious archaic unity of 
the uroboros. The self begins to focus consciousness from the natural 
world onto the individual organism, and differentiate the "self-in-here" 
from the "world-out-there". "Although man at this early stage had 
succeeded in the difficult and necessary task of transcending his 
previous state of fusion, the resultant differentiation between the 
new and higher self and its new and higher world was not absolute" (Wilber, 
1981, p.41). In fact, the boundary remained quite fluid, which gave 
rise to a "magical" consciousness, in which not only subject and object, 
but the whole and the part often became confused, very much like in the 
dream state. On this level, psychic reality tends to become confused 
with external reality and "the mental capacities, such as they are, 
(consist) basically of primary process or magico-imagery, paleosymbols, 
and proto-linguistic structures ... (it is) the self that has differentiated 
its body from the environment but not yet differentiated its own mind 
from its body" (Wilber, p.42-43). Wilber concludes from his study of 
the evolution of human consciousness that the conscious elements of one 
stage of development tend to become the unconscious elements of the next; 
what is the whole of the self at one stage tends to become a part of the 
whole of the next. 
Befor~we go on to discuss the next phase of development after the 
tymphonic, it might be useful to outline the dynamic that Wilber claims 
is responsible for transformations that occur in human consciousness. 
The fundamental dilemma of humanity, says Wilber, is the conflict between 
the desire for transcendence, wholeness (Atman consciousness), and the 
fear of the loss of the separate self, the "death" of the isolated ego 
(1981, p.13). Because man yearns for transcendence, but will not easily 
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accept the death of the separate-self sense, he seeks transcendence in 
ways that actually prevent it, with symbolic substitutes such as sex, 
money, knowledge, power, fame - human desire appears insatiable because 
its real longing is for infinity. Wilber elaborates on the two competing 
drives that most psychoanalysts agree influence the separate self -
1) the desire to perpetuate its own existence - life, power, stability, 
pleasure (Eros) and 2) the avoidance of all that threatens its dissolution -
death, dimunition (Thanatos). These drives constitute the arch battle 
and basic anxiety inherent in the separate self - a primal fear, removed 
only by transcendence into wholeness. The world of Culture, claims 
Wilber, is an elaborate substitute gratification which serves those two 
closely related functions - the need to perpetuate the self by creating 
"permanent" cultural objects and ideologies, and the corresponding need 
to stave off the ever-present terror of death. 
The determining factors in the equilibrium of these two drives are 
"translation" and "transformation". Translation is simply horizontal 
movement within the surface structure, the major purpose of which is to 
sustain the separate-self sense - to hold the self stable, equilibrated, 
constant amid flux - to reduce uncertainty and tension and ensure that 
Eros (Life) wins out over Thanatos (Death). 
Should Thanatos (which could be any sort of internal or external 
stress, pressure, new information or disintegrating strains) achieve a 
mass that outweighs Eros, the stress on the self-system becomes so great 
that a crisis ensues, translation begins to fail, and transformation to 
a new deep structure results. Depending on a number of variables, 
transformation can be toward higher or lower structures, regressive or 
progressive. This process correspondends to Hegel's term "aufheben", 
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which can either signify sublimation or suppression. "Evolution is a 
successive shift and unfolding, via transformation, of higher-order deep 
structures, within which operate, via translation, higher order surface 
structures" (Wilber, 1981, p.73). Wilber's theory of development in 
this sense, bears some resemblance to Marxist dialectic, which 
regards development as movement from the lower to the higher, 
from the simple to the complex, as a leap-like, revolutionary 
process. Moreover, this movement proceeds, not along a closed 
circuit, but in the form of a spiral, each spire being deeper, 
richer and more diverse than the preceeding one. Dialectics 
sees the sources of development in the intrinsic contradictions 
of objects and phenomena (Eros and Thanatos?). 
(Afanasyev, 1987, p.56) 
The crucial difference seems to be the lack of an underlying, acknowledged 
deep structure in Marxist dialectics. 
So far, we have looked at two major epochs in human consciousness, 
the slumber of the pre-differentiated, pre-personal uroboric period, and 
the gradual emergence of the "magical-tymphonic" structure of consciousness. 
Wilber asserts that the next major cultural development, that of farming, 
co-incided with the most prodigious mutation in consciousness yet to 
appear, a stage which Wilber calls the"mythic-membership" stage, in which 
language becomes a dominant element in the structure of consciousness. 
The emergence of this epoch serves as a useful framework in which to view 
a basic divergence between Marx's theory of consciousness development 
and that of Wilber. Marxist dialectics would posit the primacy of the 
developing labor process, out of which language and consciousness would 
arise - "The consciousness of primitive man was organically bound up 
51 
with his labor; it was, so to say, interwoven with his labor activity .•• 
in the process of labor man acquired consciousness, i.e. ability to 
reflect the surrounding world" (Afanasyev, 1987, p.52). Wilber, in 
contrast, asserts that farming was only "the most obvious effect, or 
perhaps vehicle, of a deeper transformation in structures of consciousness" 
(1981, p.88), and that it was a mental expansion that allowed man to 
picture the future, accompanied by the development of a tensed language 
structure and a more vivid apprehension of his mortality that caused 
people to develop and sustain a temporal farming culture. These two 
variant points of view represent a crucial conceptual dilemma, and seem 
to lead to an endless chicken-and-egg debate - does matter take form 
from consciousness, or vice versa? Materialists assert the primacy of 
matter (refusing to deal with ultimate cause, as that would only reflect 
abstract speculation) and say that man's manipulation of matter creates 
language, consciousness and the world-as-we-know-it - Reality. Idealists 
posit a telos of an absolute Reality, which man could only strive to 
(imperfectly) replicate. The Perennial Philosophy attempts to encompass 
these polarities with the notion of an overarching deep structure of 
increasing complexity, subject to numerous surface structure contingencies 
resultant from the activities of man upon matter. 
Within every period, according to Wilber, there are people who 
never evolved past the previous period, people who regress to earlier 
stages, people who bypass the normal developmental process into 
higher unity consciousness (the superconscious) and people with 
"precociously evolved egos •.. who first (try) out the next major structure 
of consciousness" (Wilber, 1981, p.180). Such a mythical-historical 
figure would be Homer's Odysseus, who exemplified the transition from 
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magical-archaic consciousness to mythical-membership consciousness. 
The present period of human development is the mental-egoic period, 
and represents a tremendous growth in consciousness, and the adoption 
of a mode of historical, linear and conceptual time, all accompanied 
by tremendous potentials and incredible disasters. Wilber claims that 
the 'ego's heroic emergence" was corrupted by a violent repression of 
the body, of nature, and of the feminine principle, an ultimately 
suicidal course of action. He goes on to describe the next stages of 
collective evolution, based on his perception of the 'paths of transcendence" 
traversed by a significant minority of people who have begun the 
transformation to the next level of experience. The next stage of 
growth for humanity, he claims, is the beginning of the transpersonal 
experience, specifically, the"level of psychic intuition, the beginning 
of transcendent openness and clarity, the awakening of a sense of 
awareness that is somehow more than the simple mind and body". Beyond 
this lies increasingly subtle levels of experience culminating in a 
causal level of ultimate exchange, whose paradigm is radical absorption 
in the "Uncreate" (samadhi, nirvana, pure enlightenment, etc.), the 
absolute resolution of humanitie's primal alienation - Hegel's merger 
of subject and object. 
Hegel and the Perennial Philosophy 
Hegel's philosophy, as we have seen, closely parallels the basic 
tenets of the Perennial Philosophy. In particular, he posited the Absolute 
as Spirit, Being, the infinite Totality, which was not simply One, but the 
Many - identity ih difference. He perceived the Absolute not as a static 
being, but as a process of becoming consciousness of itself through a 
development which was, for Hegel, history - the "actualization of Spirit 
in concrete particulars" (Wilber, 1981, p.314). 
The historical actualization of Spirit occurs in three major stages, 
according to Hegel, which correspond precisely to the perennial realms 
of sub-conscious, self-conscious and super-conscious. The first is 
"bewusstsein", body-awareness, the sensory perception o·f the external 
world that lacks mental reflection, and corresponds with Wilber's 
uroboric-tymphonic, or sub-conscious realms, in which slumbering Nature 
is "self-alienated Spirit". The second phase,"selbstbewusstsein", involves 
self-awareness and mental reflection, and an enhanced sense of alienation 
due to the stresses of self-consciousness - this correlates with Wilber's 
egoic-consciousness. Hegel's third phase, "vernunft", is the synthesis 
of objectivity and subjectivity, or transcendent knowledge, and corresponds 
with the superconscious awareness of the Absolute as the ultimate and 
all-embracing Reality, the end point of human development, in accordance 
with various mystical traditions. 
Hegel's major contribution, according to Wilber, was the notion that 
though each level transcends and surpasses the next, the prior stages are 
preserved by the higher stages in a process of negation, negation of the 
negation, and higher resolution (Fichte's thesis, anti-thesis and 
synthesis). In Wilber's terminology, each level emerges as a thesis, 
with Eros dominating all translations, negating everything which threatens 
its purview. Thanatos manifests as a contradiction (anti-thesis) or 
negation of the original negation, so that both Eros and Thanatos of 
this level are subsumed in a higher order synthesis created by transform-
ation - unity on a higher, more inclusive plane" ... and so on throughout 
evolution .•• the upshot of all this is that each level is negated but 
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preserved on a higher level, until all stages are stripped of their 
partiality ... and only all-pervading Life remains, free of contradiction, 
free of negation, free of alienation" (Wilber, 1981, p.316). One major 
criticism that can be leveled at Hegel from the point of view of the 
Perennial Philosophy is his failure to differentiate the many subtle 
layers of higher awareness, which he subsumed under the all-embracing 
term of Spirit. Many of the Oriental traditions, with centuries of 
both empirical and hermeneutical studies of consciousness behind them 
contain a much more refined delineation of the complexities of these 
stages. Aside from that criticism, Hegel's philosophy generally 
reflects the basic tenets of the Perennial Philosophy, and he remains 
one of a handful of Western philosophers whose ideas are compatible 
with, and parallel those of the Oriental mystical traditions. 
Marx and the Perennial Philosophy 
Marx centered his work around the idea that the mode of production 
of any given period of history conditions the social, political and 
mental life of man. In particular, he pointed to exploited labor as 
indicative of alienated labor, and alienated labor as indicative of 
alienated thought and feeling - which produced what he called "false 
consciousness". His observations focused mainly on elements of material 
exchange - food, production, labor, capital, capital, etc. - the lower 
(physical) level of human existence. 
One of Marx's enduring insights, according to Wilber, is that 
distortions on the lower levels can cause deformities in the exchanges 
of the senior levels. Thus, when people are deprived of basic sustenance, 
for example, because of the concentration of wealth and resources in 
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the hands of an elite, it forms a distressed base upon which thinking 
and feeling is constructed. It fixates the minds of the poor on the 
lower levels, tending them toward depression, and it allows the rich to 
exploit and overindulge their lower level needs, a degenerate use of 
the material level which ironically als6 fixates their consciousness 
on the lower levels but in a reverse way. Thus Marx can say that not 
only workers, but capitalists as well, are alienated(Axelos, 1976, p.60). 
Wilber outlines four inadequacies in Marxist theory. First is 
Marx's overcommittment to materialism, which Wilber agrees is important 
on itle primary level of existence, but progressively less so as one 
moves up the "Great Chain of Being'', and only then insofar as the upper 
levels are contaminated by distortions from the lower. Secondly, he 
feels that the materialist orientation predisposes Marx to the idea 
that the lower levels of being don't simply influence, but cause the 
higher levels of consciousness. While Wilber believes that the higher 
levels come through, and are thus affected by the lower, Marx thinks 
that the higher comesfrom the lower and is causally produced by it. 
Third, Marx fails to understand that the effectsof material distortions 
can, to some extent, be overcome at and by a higher level, though often 
with great difficulty- a possibility that Wilber claims refutes the 
pre-eminence of material production in the determination of consciousness. 
Fourth, though traditional Marxism understood the brutality of external 
oppression, Marx did not fully investigate the internal, psychological 
mechanics of repression. Material repression, according to Wilber, is 
merely the most ontologically primitive, and therefore the most visible 
form. Later theorists, such as Freud, and Fromm and Marcuse of the 
Frankfurt School more fully developed this internalized aspect of 
56 
repression. To quote Marcuse, "There is such a thing as the Self - it 
does not yet exist but it must be attained, fought for against all those 
who are preventing its emergence, and who substitute for it an illusory 
self, namely the subject of voluntary servitude in production and 
consumption" (Wilber, 1981, p.268). Marcuse thus supports the fundamental 
Marxist notion that a more evolved self will emerge when obstructions 
and distortions on the material level are removed. 
Marx gives no satisfactory explanation as to why a more highly 
developed, complex individual will emerge when material hindrances are 
removed. It seems that, were desire to be allowed unobstructed express-
ion, man would be as likely, in the absence of an over·arc:1ing deep 
structure, to sink back into pre-personal, pranic sexual-emotional 
levels of experience as he would be to rise to new heights of subtle 
artistic, intellectual or spiritual activity. It is worth noting that 
the ultimate state of activity intuited by Marx is an uninhibited 
play of desire, while the mystical traditions encompassed by the Per-
ennial Philosophy unanimously posit a state of desirelessness as a 
precondition for the realization of the higher states of consciousness. 
One can draw their own conclusions from this observation, and they are 
sure to be varied, but the infinite play of desire and sensuality 
could possibly serve to keep consciousness fixated on the lower levels 
of materiality, precluding the development of the more subtle states 
of awareness. 
Conclusion 
The attempt to classify and investigate the various aspects of 
alienation is probably itself symtomatic of the disease of alienation. 
The effort. to construct rational arguments in defense of a 
transcendence of rationality is also probably indicative of a certain 
intellectual neuros~s. And any endeavor to reconcile aspects of Hegelian 
and Marxist thought is foolhardy at best. Taking all of this into 
consideration with the sober eye of hindsight, I must confess to a 
treatment of the subject of alienation that has at most been tentative, 
exploratory, and admittedly playful, that has generated more questions 
than answers, and which led not to closure or intellectual satisfaction, 
but deeper into the complexity of the problem. 
The study served to lead me into hitherto unexplored realms, such 
as the rich debate on totality and holism that is ongoing in the Marxist, 
Neo-Marxist and non-Marxist traditions. Many strands of thought beckoned -
the critical psychoanalytical interpretations of Marx's theories seemed 
particularly fruitful, and worthy of much deeper treatment than I could 
afford them. Exploring feminist theories of alienation and oppression 
would certainly have added depth to the work. The writings of Sartre 
and other existentialists were looked at, but not incorporated into my 
essay. The theological dimension of alienation, as discussed by writers 
such as Tillich would have been another important dimension to explore. 
And any study of modern alienation that neglects Weber's work on bureau-
cracies is of course incomplete. 
Given these diverse possibilities, and faced with the necessity of 
limits, I chose to explore what was the most intriguing aspect of alienation 
to me - the subjective, individual sense of separation from a greater 
whole, and possible avenues of reconciliation. Is a new level of exper-
ience possible - a level of true connection with the natural world, with 
the deeper, unexplored layers of our own psyches, with our fellow human 
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beings, with the entire cosmos? The resurgence of interest in Oriental 
mysticism, the human potential movement, and interest in ecology, holistic 
health and a unified new physics, not to mention a burgeoning literature 
on the transformation of consciousness indicate a profound human need 
for coherence and unity. This seeking has spawned a powerful, if subtle 
cultural movement over the past two decades, the fruits of which have 
influenced every aspect of human life. If such a level of connection 
is possible, what avenue holds out the most hope of achieving it? A 
· purely subjective approach, in which we change our mental framework and 
expect the material world to respond accordingly? A radical, even 
revolutionary readjustment of our objective social/economic/political 
conditions? Or a dynamic synthesis of these two extremes? 
Exhibiting opposing tendencies to the search for a unifying holism 
are a group of thinkers called "post-structuralists" who "affirm instead 
the infinite play of desire, non-identity, difference, repetition and 
displacement that earlier thinkers had decried as an expression of 
alienation and estrangement" (Jay, 1984, p.512). To them, the "unhappy 
consciousness" or alienated self for which Hegel sought resolution in 
the subject/object merger and Marx prescribed social revolution, is 
a bulwark against the suppression of difference, a celebration of the 
infinite play of an untotalized reality (Jay, p.516), a joyful, if rranic aa:ept-
ance of and surrender to the quantum flux of human experience. A cursory 
reading of post-structuralism hints at its nihilist and anarchist poten-
tial, but also suggests an important new dimension in the analysis of 
power and resistance and the more subtle and pervasive forms of oppression, 
as well as a re-evaluation of the problem (non-problem?) of alienation. 
Is any resolution of these seemingly contradictory tendencies 
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possible, or even desirable? Is it realistic to assume that, as a 
species, we might find ways of reweaving the fabric of our individual 
and collective lives so as to achieve a maximum of freedom, creative 
expression and diversity within an expanded sense of our interconn-
ection and interdependence? Martin Jay summarizes the importance of 
such a quest in his critique of the post-structuralists: 
The escape into an anti-holistic particularism by "specific" 
as opposed to "universal" intellectuals ... fails to confront this 
incontrovertable reality (the threat of global holocaust) ... that 
infinite carnivalesque play of which post-structuralists are so 
fond may turn out to be much more suddenly and decisively finite 
than they or anyone else would desire unless some means of thwart-
ing nuclear totalization is found. And without acknowledging the 
complex interrelatedness of our planetary existence, no such sol-
ution is likely to be forthcoming ... The search for a viable concept 
of totality should not therefore be written off as no more than a 
benighted exercise in nostalgia for a past plenitude or the ideo-
logy of intellectuals bent on legitimating their domination of 
the rest of mankind. For if the human race is to avoid the nega-
tive totality of nuclear catastrophe, we may well need to find 
some positive alternative ... is it too much to hope that amidst 
the debris there lurks, silent but still potent, the germ of a 
truly defensible totality ... the potential of a liberating total-
ization that will not turn into its opposite? ... to give up the 
search is to resign ourselves to a desting against which every-
thing which makes us human should compel us to resist. (1981, p.537) 
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The possibility that there exists an undifferentiated, dealienated 
whole - an historical, psychological or spiritual condition in which 
all phenomenon are perceived as One - is both alluring (in its poten-
tial to bring about a peaceful world) and frightening (totality/ 
totalitarian) in its implications. It is obviously an intriguing 
enough concept to engage the attentiai of thinkers over the centuries, 
as has been demonstrated in this thesis. To come to any conclusion 
on the matter would be to resolve a number of perennial questions, 
and be more than presumptuous. I have only attempted to present the 
thinking of a handful of scholars on the subject, and even that treat-
ment has only been partial. All the thinkers explored have embraced 
the possibility of a dealienated whole, though much of their thinking 
has been shown to be contradictory. Only the post-structuralists, 
whose ideas were hinted at, but not examined, seem to scorn the poss-
ibility of holism altogether. Were I to continue this study, an in-
depth look at the major thinkers identified (though they reject the 
notion of identity) with this body of thought - Lacan, Foucault, 
Lyotard - would enlarge the scope of this study, and add, I believe, 
an important dimension to an already complex debate. 
Whether we view the human being, and thus the child, as a member 
of a unified, harmonious whole, or as an isolated consciousness, dis-
placed and drifting through existence, certainly has implications for 
curriculum theory. Despite numerous competing cultural influences, 
what educators select from a vast array of sense phenomenon and how 
they organize it and present it to the student is instrumental in de-
termining the view of reality .held by the student. How we treat the 
child in the classroom is largely dependent on our philosophical con-
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ception of human nature. We approach a mass of matter with a blank 
mental slate differently than we approach an expression of the Divine 
Consciousness! In the former case, we might be tempted to impose a 
narrow, self-interested perspective on the student; in the latter, we 
would be more likely to participate with reverence and awe in the mir-
aculous unfolding of consciousness. 
The discourse on holism, totality and alienation will continue. 
If Wilber and Huxley are correct, in that there is no resolution of 
the question but that which occurs through direct, immediate exper-
ience (transformation), perhaps one of our most significant curriculum 
questions might be how to facilitate conditions in which this exper-
ience becomes possible. 
In my dissertation, I will explore in depth the implications of 
holism for curriculum theory~ by studying emergent themes of dealien-
ation and reconnection within post-Liberal, holistic and Nee-Humanistic 
theories of education. 
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